| Ng Wai Pin v Ong Yew Teik and other appeals [2025] MLJU 1357
Federal Court (Putrajaya) Witness immunity – Malicious prosecution – abuse of process – conspiracy and fraud |
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(1) Whether a witness who gives oral and/or written evidence in judicial proceedings is absolutely immune from civil liability, even if the evidence is allegedly false, fabricated, or given with malicious intent? (a) The Federal Court answered this question in the affirmative. The Federal Court emphasized that allowing a new claim against witnesses based on the same facts and evidence already litigated would be contrary to the proper administration of justice. It stated –
(b) The Federal Court found that the Plaintiff’s pleadings in Suit 460 were based on testimony and acts performed by the defendants in the course of the earlier proceedings, which fall within the protection of witness immunity –
(c) The Federal Court further explained that the rationale for this immunity is rooted in public policy to prevent a flood of repeat litigation based on the same issues, facts, and evidence –
(d) The Federal Court also clarified that this absolute immunity is not limited to what is said in court but also extends to preparatory steps and related conduct outside court. In adopting the Australian position, the Federal Court held –
(e) Accordingly, the Federal Court affirmed that witness immunity in Malaysia is absolute, consistent with common law principles in the UK and Australia, and applies both to courtroom testimony and related preparatory acts. All claims against the witnesses were therefore barred. (2) Whether the tort of malicious prosecution is actionable in the context of civil proceedings in Malaysia? (a) The Federal Court answered this question in the negative. The Federal Court examined foreign authorities cited by the Plaintiff, including Crawford Adjusters and Willers v Joyce, which support extending the tort of malicious prosecution to civil proceedings. The Court, however, found these authorities unpersuasive and held that the tort is not recognised under Malaysian law for ordinary civil disputes. (b) The Court stressed that the Plaintiff had already succeeded in the earlier action (Suit 1333), obtained judgment, and received compensation thus had no legal basis to reinitiate another action under a different legal suit –
(c) The Court noted that no express findings of fabrication, perjury, conspiracy or malicious prosecution were made in Suit 1333. In fact, the Plaintiff had been awarded damages with interest, and therefore suffered no compensable harm in law (para [122]). (d) Accordingly, the Court held that the tort of malicious prosecution is not recognised in ordinary civil litigation in Malaysia and the Plaintiff’s claim was properly struck out. (3) Whether fraud based on perjury is a recognised and actionable tort in Malaysia? (a) The Federal Court answered this question in the negative. The Federal Court held that the allegations of false or dishonest testimony by the Defendants in the earlier proceedings (Suit 1333) cannot give rise to an independent civil claim. The law in Malaysia recognises absolute witness immunity for statements and conduct arising in the course of judicial proceedings even if the statements were false or malicious –
(b) The Court also found that the Plaintiff’s claims, including fraud, conspiracy to injure, and malicious prosecution, were simply a relabelling of grievances already litigated. No fresh wrongdoing was identified outside of what had already been adjudicated in Suit 1333 –
“The Court of Appeal erred in law and fact by allowing the Plaintiff’s appeal and disregarding the application of witness immunity to D1–D5.” (para [112])
(c) As such, the Federal Court affirmed that fraud based on perjury is not an actionable tort under Malaysian law, and the Plaintiff’s action was barred by witness immunity and an abuse of process. (4) Whether the doctrine of res judicata and finality of litigation barred the second suit? (a) The Federal Court answered this question in the affirmative. The Federal Court held that Suit 460 was barred by the doctrine of res judicata and constituted an abuse of process, as the Plaintiff sought to relitigate matters that had already been fully addressed and decided in Suit 1333.
(b) The Federal Court emphasized that the Plaintiff had already succeeded in the first suit and obtained his remedy, including interest, and therefore had no legal basis to reopen the dispute –
(c) The Federal Court rejected the argument that different causes of action justified the second suit, stating clearly that this was an impermissible attempt to repackage the same dispute –
(d) The Federal Court warned that allowing such repeated litigation would harm the justice system by encouraging never-ending disputes. (e) Accordingly, the Federal Court upheld the High Court’s decision to strike out Suit 460 as barred by res judicata and finality of litigation, and ruled that the Plaintiff’s action was a clear abuse of process. |
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