LLE v OKC [2022] 5 MLRA 208

LLE v OKC [2022] 5 MLRA 208

Federal Court (Putrajaya) 

Ineligibility of Political Parties to Maintain Defamation Actions

1. The Appellant, LLE, was a Member of Parliament who held a press conference at the corridor of Parliament on 15 March 2017. During this conference, the Appellant made statements regarding the MCA, a registered political society and a component party of the ruling Federal Government.
2. The essence of the alleged defamatory statement was that MCA, despite receiving public donations and Government funds intended to assist Chinese schools, kept those funds for itself. Specifically, the Appellant alleged that the money went into “MCA’s own pocket” and never came out.
3. The Respondent, OKC, suing in his capacity as the registered public officer of MCA under the Societies Act 1966 (“Act 355”), initiated a defamation suit against the Appellant. 
4. The Appellant subsequently applied to strike out the claim under order 18 rule 19(1)(a) or (b), (c) and/or (d) of the Rules of Court 2012, arguing that a political party has no locus standi to maintain a suit for defamation.
5. The High Court dismissed the striking-out application, relying on the Federal Court’s earlier decision in CCJ v Government of State of Sarawak & Anor [2019] 1 MLRA 515 (“CCJ”), which had rejected the English “Derbyshire principle” that prevents government bodies from suing for defamation. 
6. The Court of Appeal affirmed this dismissal, leading to the appeal before the Federal Court.

Whether a political party can maintain a suit for defamation.

(1)    Whether a political party can maintain a suit for defamation.

(a) The Federal Court held that a political party does not possess the type of reputation that the law of defamation is designed to protect. While individuals have reputations tied to dignity (ART v SV 1964 1 MLRH 296), corporations have trading reputations (MKW v MSB [2016] 6 MLRA 535) and Governments have “governing reputations” for public trust (CCJ), a political party lacks these specific attributes. Because the cause of action in defamation hinges on such a reputation, a political party seriously lacks the standing to bring such a claim.

(b) The Federal Court applied and extended the Derbyshire principle, which holds that governmental bodies should be open to uninhibited public criticism to political parties. Relying on the English case of Goldsmith & Another v Bhoyrul & Others [1998] QB 459, the Federal Court reasoned that it is contrary to public interest for a political party seeking power to sue the very voters they represent.

(c) Allowing political parties to sue for defamation would create an undesirable “chilling effect” on freedom of speech. In a free democratic society, political parties must be open to public scrutiny and criticism and must not be “thin-skinned”.

(d) The Federal Court noted that political parties have ample resources to “answer back” through press conferences, public announcements and social media to counter unflattering comments. Furthermore, individual members or officers of the party can still sue for defamation if they are personally and sufficiently identified in a defamatory publication.

(e) The Federal Court rejected the extension that political parties may sue for defamation based on the Respondent’s argument that the Government could sue for defamation (as decided in CCJ). It was held that CCJ was decided based on section 3 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 (“GPA”), which provides the Government a specific statutory right to sue.

(f) Since the GPA does not apply to societies, the statutory right enjoyed by the state Government in CCJ does not extend to political parties. Therefore, the common law bars (as per Derbyshire and Goldsmith) remain the applicable law for political societies in Malaysia.

(g) Unlike incorporated companies which have separate legal personalities, a society under Malaysian law is dependent on its members and cannot sue or be sued in its own name. This lack of separate personality reinforces the conclusion that the entity itself cannot assert a protectable reputation.

1. The Federal Court unanimously allowed the appeal and answered the legal question in the negative.
2. The Federal Court set aside the decisions of the High Court and the Court of Appeal. Consequently, the Appellant’s application to strike out the suit was allowed and the defamation suit filed by MCA was struck out.
3. The Federal Court also distinguished this case from CCJ, noting that the latter involved a state Government’s statutory right to sue under the Government Proceedings Act 1956 which does not apply to societies like political parties.

1. In Malaysia, a political party, as a registered society, has no cause of action to maintain a defamation suit.
2. The decision prioritizes freedom of speech and uninhibited public criticism of political entities as essential components of a functioning democracy.
3. The Federal Court clarified that even if a party has the procedural capacity to sue (such as via a public officer), they must still possess a substantive cause of action. In defamation, this requires a protectable reputation, which a political party lacks.
4. While the party itself cannot sue, individual politicians or officials retain the right to sue for defamation if they are personally targeted by defamatory statements.
5. The Malaysian Federal Court formally adopted the logic of the Derbyshire and Goldsmith principles, aligning Malaysian law with common law jurisdictions that prohibit political bodies from using defamation suits to stifle criticism.