MT Ventures Sdn Bhd & Anor v QM Print Sdn Bhd [2025] 2 MLJ 341

Court of Appeal (Putrajaya)

Validity and Appealability of Notice of Appeal 

1. The Respondent, a company operating its business, was a tenant of a premise in Kuala Lumpur (“Premise No. 24”), which was owned by a foreign individual. Adjacent to this was Premise No. 22, owned by the First Appellant and tenanted by the Second Appellant, who also conducted its business operations there. 
2. A fire broke out at Premise No. 22 and spread to Premise No. 24 and other nearby properties. As a result, the Respondent initiated a legal action against the Appellants, seeking damages for the losses it suffered in its business. Additionally, the Respondent also brought the action on behalf of the owner of Premise No. 24, claiming compensation for damages caused to the property as a result of the fire.
3. Subsequently, the Appellants filed an application to strike out certain parts of the Respondent’s Statement of Claim, specifically targeting particular paragraphs and reliefs (“striking out application”). The High Court dismissed this application on 10 May 2023 (“the Order”). Aggrieved by this, the Appellants filed a notice of appeal against that decision.
4. The Respondent then filed a motion to strike out the Appellants’ appeal, arguing that the Notice of Appeal was defective. The Respondent’s contention was that the order in question was not appealable under the newly amended paragraph 68(1)(f) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (CJA), which came into effect on 1 October 2022 through section 8 of the Courts of Judicature (Amendment) Act 2022. It was further argued that the High Court’s decision did not conclusively determine the rights of the parties, as the same issues could still be addressed and adjudicated during the trial.
5. In response, the Appellants asserted that their right to appeal was a substantive legal right that had accrued when the Respondent first commenced the suit by filing the writ and statement of claim well before the amendment came into force. They relied on the Macnaghten test, a common law principle adopted by the Federal Court in Lim Phin Khian v Kho Su Ming [1996] 1 MLJ 1, which supports the principle that substantive rights crystallize at the initiation of proceedings.

1. Whether pursuant to paragraph 68(1)(f) of the CJA, the notice of appeal filed by the appellants was defective and/or not appealable

1. The Appellants argued that their right to appeal was a substantive right that accrued when the Writ and Statement of Claim were filed, that is, before the amendment took effect. 
2. The Appellants relied on the common law principle from Colonial Sugar Refining Co Ltd v Irving [1905] AC 369 (PC), commonly referred to as the Macnaghten test, which establishes that procedural rights, such as appeals, vest at the commencement of proceedings and are not to be affected by subsequent legislation unless Parliament clearly provides otherwise. They also cited Lim Phin Khian v Kho Su Ming [1996] 1 MLJ 1 (FC), in which the Federal Court held that the right to appeal is a vested and substantive right unless expressly or by necessary implication displaced.
3. The Respondent, however, contended that paragraph 68(1)(f) of CJA applied to all strike-out decisions delivered on or after 1 October 2022, regardless of when the original proceedings began. The Court of Appeal accepted this position, noting that the amendment was intended to reduce the Court of Appeal’s caseload by eliminating interlocutory appeals that do not finally dispose of the rights of the parties. In adopting a purposive approach, the court referred to Palm Oil Research and Development Board Malaysia & Anor v Premium Vegetable Oils Sdn Bhd [2005] 3 MLJ 97 (FC) and Director of Inland Revenue v Alcatel-Lucent Malaysia Sdn Bhd [2012] 4 MLJ 386 (CA) to support the principle that Parliament’s intent must guide statutory interpretation.
4. The Court of Appeal emphasized the wording of paragraph 68(1)(f) of CJA, which uses the past tense “dismissed,” signifying that it governs all dismissals occurring on or after the effective date, not merely those where the underlying cause of action arose post-amendment. It concluded that the relevant date is the date of the High Court’s decision, not the date of the originating claim.
5. In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeal also referred to Westcourt Corporation Sdn Bhd v Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah & Anor [2004] 2 MLJ 481 (CA) and Chebaro v Director of Immigration & Ors [2003] 1 MLJ 409 (CA), reinforcing the principle that when statutory language is clear, Courts must give effect to the plain meaning unless injustice would result.
6. The Court of Appeal ultimately held that Parliament had intended to override the Macnaghten test in the context of paragraph 68(1)(f) of CJA, and thus, the prohibition on appeals applied to all post-1 October 2022 decisions, regardless of when the suit was commenced. The Appellants’ right of appeal had not vested at the time of filing their case but only at the moment the High Court made its decision, a point after the amendment came into force.
7. Accordingly, the notice of appeal filed by the Appellants was deemed incompetent. The Respondent’s motion to strike out the appeal was allowed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed that no appeal lies from a High Court’s dismissal of a striking out application under the amended provision of the CJA.

In interpreting paragraph 68(1)(f) of the CJA, the Court adopted a purposive approach, emphasising that Parliament’s intention was to reduce the Court of Appeal’s caseload by removing interlocutory appeals that do not finally dispose of the rights of the parties.