Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Unggul Tangkas Sdn Bhd & Anor and other appeals [2020] 2 MLJ 721

Federal Court (Putrajaya)

Right to intervene in land matter

1. The Respondent owned two parcels of land (“the scheduled land”) which were acquired for the Appellant under paragraph 3(1)(a) of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 (“the Act”). 
2. The Respondent was granted a sum of RM12,593,196 as full compensation for its interest in the scheduled land, payable by the Appellant. Dissatisfied with this amount, the Respondent lodged an objection by filing Form N under section 37 of the Act and commenced two land reference proceedings in the High Court.
3. The Appellant then applied under order 15 rule 6 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“ROC”) to be joined as an intervener (enclosure 7) in those reference proceedings and sought permission to tender its own valuation report together with rebuttal reports.  The High Court allowed the Appellant to intervene but refused to admit its valuation and rebuttal evidence.
4. Both sides appealed to the Court of Appeal.  The Respondent challenged the order allowing intervention, while the Appellant appealed the refusal to admit its evidence.  The Court of Appeal ultimately ruled that the Appellant had no right to intervene in the land reference proceedings at all, thus the Appellant appealed to the Federal Court.

Ratio

Whether Form N under section 37 of the Act is the only mechanism for a paymaster to become a party in a land reference matter.

1. The Federal Court held that the land reference proceedings before the High Court concerned only the landowner, Unggul Tangkas Sdn Bhd, as it was the party disputing the amount of compensation awarded under the Land Acquisition Act 1960.  The Federal Court emphasised that a person wishing to contest an award must file an objection in Form N pursuant to section 37 of the Act.  This requirement is fundamental as it ensures that challenges to the land administrator’s award are dealt with efficiently and within the statutory framework. Since the Appellant neither filed Form N nor was it the party aggrieved by the quantum of compensation, it had no standing to be treated as a party to the land reference.
2. The Federal Court further decided that order 15 rule 6(2)(b) of the ROC could not be relied upon by the Appellant to intervene.   Under subsection 45(2) of the Act, the ROC shall apply as long as there is no inconsistency with any provisions relating to procedures in the same Act.   The Federal Court held that using order 15 rule 6(2)(b) to enlarge participation in land reference proceedings would be inconsistent with the Act’s structure.  The Federal Court endorsed the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Sistem Lingkaran Lebuhraya Kajang Sdn Bhd v Inch Kenneth Kajang Rubber Ltd & Anor [2011] 4 MLJ 403; [2011] 1 CLJ 95, where the Court of Appeal concluded that intervention under order 15 rule 6 is inappropriate in land acquisition matters because the Act provides a closed and self-contained mechanism governing the parties entitled to participate.  In contrast, the earlier decision in Sistem Penyuraian Trafik KL Barat Sdn Bhd v Kenny Heights Development Sdn Bhd & Anor [2009] 3 MLJ 809; [2009] 4 CLJ 57, which allowed intervention, was declined, as the Federal Court preferred the interpretation in Sistem Lingkaran that aligned more closely with the statutory scheme.
3. The Federal Court also distinguished the decision in Damai Motor Kredit Sdn Bhd & Anor v Kementerian Kerja Raya Malaysia [2015] 1 CLJ 44 where the landowners were true “persons interested” under section 2 of the Act as their land had been acquired, and they were originally entitled to participate in the proceedings.  By contrast, in the present case, the Appellant was not the landowner nor a party with statutory rights under section 37 and therefore could not rely on Damai Motor Kredit to justify intervention.
4. The Federal Court concluded that the Appellant had no legal interest recognisable under the Act.  At most, it had a pecuniary concern as paymaster, which did not grant standing in land reference proceedings. The Federal Court cited Tohtonku Sdn Bhd v Superace (M) Sdn Bhd [1992] 2 MLJ 63; [1992] 2 CLJ 1153; [1992] 1 CLJ Rep 344, explaining that mere financial exposure does not amount to a legally enforceable interest. The Federal Court stressed that the land administrator bears the statutory obligation to defend the award, relying on Collector of Land Revenue v Alagappa Chettiar; Collector of Land Revenue v Ong Thye Eng [1971] 1 MLJ 43; [1968] 1 LNS 31, which affirmed that the land administrator may lead whatever evidence is necessary to uphold the award.
5. Finally, the Federal Court noted that the land in question was acquired under paragraph 3(1)(a) of the Act for a public purpose. In such cases, the acquiring authority and the paymaster is the State Authority, not the benefiting corporation. Therefore, TNB could not claim the status of an acquiring party that would justify participation. Given these considerations, the Federal Court answered the first question in the affirmative in which filing Form N is the only route for a party to participate. The second question was answered in the negative, which is that a paymaster has no automatic entitlement to be joined. 

Intervention under order 15 rule 6 of the ROC is not allowed in land acquisition cases. The ROC cannot be used to expand participation in land reference proceedings as the Land Acquisition Act provides a complete, closed system. All in all, statutory procedures override general civil procedure rules.