Seema Elizabeth Isoy v Tan Sri David Chiu Tat-Cheong [2024] 4 MLJ 260

Federal Court (Putrajaya)

Defamation — Defamatory statements — Half-truth statement

1. The Appellant, Seema Elizabeth Isoy, was a unit owner and committee member of Waldorf & Windsor Tower (W&W) and part of a WhatsApp group comprising 55 unit owners.
2. The Respondent, Tan Sri David Chiu Tat-Cheong, was the Chairman and founder of Malaysia Land Properties Sdn Bhd (Mayland), the developer of W&W.
3. There were previous court rulings against Mayland for fraud and misrepresentation regarding W&W.
4. On 17 August 2017, the Appellant posted a message in the WhatsApp group referring to the Chiu family’s criminal history, specifically noting that David Chiu was once charged with fraud but omitted the fact that he had been acquitted.
5. The Respondent sued the appellant for defamation.
6. The High Court dismissed the suit, but the Court of Appeal overturned that decision and awarded RM100,000 in damages to the Respondent.
7. The Appellant appealed to the Federal Court.

1. Whether a half-truth statement, which omits material facts and presents a misleading impression, can be defamatory?
2. Whether such a statement defeats the defences of justification, fair comment, and qualified privilege?

(a) The Federal Court answered this question in the affirmative. The Court held —

‘The charging of the respondent without stating that the respondent was acquitted was a half-truth statement that harmed the respondent. The statement was not substantially true and false in substance.’ (para [37]).

(b) The Court found that although the factual content of the impugned statement may be technically accurate, it was materially misleading due to the deliberate omission of the Respondent’s acquittal. Accordingly, the Federal Court stated –

‘The full truth of the respondent already being acquitted was deliberately not disclosed in the impugned statement and this placed a different complexion and effect on the statement.’ (para [40]).

(c)  The Court held that such omission created a false impression that tainted the Respondent’s character and reputation, concluding that –

‘The message without the fact that the respondent had been acquitted, tainted the respondent’s character and conduct and the respondent was held in ridicule, reprobation, and contempt.’ (para [40]).

(d) This established the defamatory nature of the impugned statement. The Court emphasized that –

‘A half-truth statement that presents a false impression and that harms the reputation of a person is no doubt, defamatory.’ (para [47]).

(e)  Accordingly, such a half-truth was found to be capable of bearing a defamatory meaning. The Federal Court affirmed the applicability of Common Law on half-truths. The Court stated –

‘The issue of half-truth statements was not governed by written law, in particular the Defamation Act 1957 or the principle of law laid down by the courts. As such, the principles of English common law on the concept of half-truth statement were applicable in our defamation law pursuant to s 3(1) of the Civil Law Act 1956.’ (para [66]).

(f)   Thus, the Federal Court held that the English common law principles governing half-truths supplement Malaysian defamation law where no express statutory provision exists.

(2)  Whether such a statement defeats the defences of justification, fair comment, and qualified privilege?

(a) The Federal Court again answered this question in the affirmative. On the defence of justification, the Court held that:

‘The appellant’s defence of justification   was also unsustainable as the impugned statement was not substantially true and presented a false impression in the readers’ eyes.’ (para [77]).

(b) Regarding qualified privilege, the Court ruled that the appellant acted with malice, stating –

‘An action of deliberately publishing a half-truth statement that presented a false impression of a person… was a conduct actuated with malice.’ (para [76])..

(c)  As a result, the defence of qualified privilege was defeated –

‘In the circumstances, the defence of qualified privilege… was defeated and untenable.’ (para [76]).

(d) In S Pakianathan v Jenni Ibrahim [1988] 2 MLJ 173, the Supreme Court stated –

“The protection afforded by the law to a publication made on an occasion of qualified privilege is not an absolute protection but depends on the honesty of purpose of the person who makes the publication. If he is malicious, that is, if he uses the occasion for some other purpose than that for which the law gives protection, he will not be able to rely on the privilege.”

(e)  Similarly, in Rajagopal v Rajan [1972] 1 MLJ 45, the Court explained –

“Malice which avoids qualified privilege is ill-will or spite or any indirect or improper motive in the mind of the defendant at the time of publication and actuating it.” (citing Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol 24, s 138, p 79).

(f)   These cases reaffirm the principle that malice defeats qualified privilege, and the Federal Court in the Seema Elizabeth Isoy case applied this principle where the deliberate omission of a material acquittal was found to be a misuse of a privileged occasion for an improper purpose.

(g) On fair comment, the Court concluded –

‘The defence of fair comment… does not apply in the present case.’ (para [29]).

(h)  This was because the statement largely comprised factual assertions rather than genuine commentary, and was also made with malice, which defeats the defence –

‘Further, the impugned message was made with malice and demolished the defence of fair comment or even qualified privilege.’ (para [29])

(i)    Thus, the Federal Court held that all three defences were unavailable, affirming the Court of Appeal’s decision that the impugned statement was defamatory and unlawful.

1. The Federal Court dismissed the appeal. It affirmed the Court of Appeal’s finding that the impugned statement was defamatory. The Court held that omitting the acquittal made the message a half-truth, which harmed the respondent’s reputation. All of the appellant’s defences failed, and the RM100,000 damages and injunction were upheld.

1. Half-truths can be defamatory if they distort the full reality and harm a person’s reputation.
2. Context and omission matter, defamation is not just about what is said, but also what is not said.
3. The English common law on defamation, particularly on half-truths, applies in Malaysia by virtue of subsection 3(1) of Civil Law Act 1956.
4. Malice can be inferred from intentional omissions of critical facts.
5. Even in informal settings (like WhatsApp groups), individuals can be liable for defamation.